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BiBliogRApHy.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
1. Gibraltar was conquered in the first days of  August 1704 by an Anglo-Dutch naval force 
that was supporting the Archduke Carlos of  Hapsburg’s pretensions to the Spanish throne. In 
1713, as part of  the prize for peace and his recognition as King of  Spain, Philip V had to agree 
to cede it in perpetuity to the British Crown. It was thus resolved in Article X of  the Treaty 
of  Utrecht that, nevertheless, foresaw that the ceded property would not generate territorial 
jurisdiction and would have no overland communication with the rest of  the peninsula. This 
also recognised that Spain had a right of  first refusal “in case it shall hereafter seem meet to 
the Crown of  Great Britain to grant, sell or by any means to alienate from the propriety of  
the said town of  Gibraltar”.
2. Throughout the XVIII Century, there were numerous initiatives to regain Gibraltar 
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through its sale or exchange (even including Ceuta) or recurrence to force. It was all in vain 
and in no less than four successive treaties (Seville, 1729; Aachen, 1748; Paris, 1763; Versailles, 
1783) the Statute of  Utrecht was confirmed.
3. In the XIX Century, Great Britain, in fact, extended its jurisdiction, enlarging this to 
include waters of  the Bay of  Algeciras and the sandy isthmus that joined the town of  Gibraltar 
to the peninsula. In 1908, Britain put up a fence to consolidate its appropriation of  more than 
half  of  the sandy isthmus and to better control the traffic of  persons. In 1938, right in the 
middle of  the Spanish Civil War, Britain build an airstrip there which penetrates more than 
half  a kilometre into the Bay of  Algeciras. Spain, on the other hand, relaxed the severity of  
the limits agreed upon in 1713. Commercial relationships, both regular and irregular, became 
the norm. Several thousand Spaniards crossed the fence every day to work in Gibraltar and 
the neighbouring Spanish territory also became a dormitory region for Gibraltarians and 
members of  the British garrison.
II. GIBRALTAR AND DECOLONISATION: THE UNITED NATIONS 
RESOLUTIONS
4. Described as a Crown Colony from 1830 onwards, Great Britain, gave information 
on Gibraltar as a non-self-governing territory according to article 73 e) of  the United Nations 
Charter as from 1947, forming part of  the list of  territories pending decolonisation once the 
declaration on the granting of  independence to colonial countries and peoples was passed in 
1960 (Resolution 1514-XV, of  December 14).
5. Legally and politically speaking the situation raised by Gibraltar was of  great interest. 
From a juridical point of  view, the Spanish objective was to safeguard rights according to 
the Treaty of  Utrecht and prevent the Gibraltarian population being recognised as having 
the right to self-determination that was liable to lead to the independence of  the territory 
or to its association with Great Britain. From a political viewpoint, it was a question of  the 
United Nations endorsing the bilateral Hispano-British negotiations as the way to reach a 
main agreement that would put an end to a colonial situation by returning Gibraltar to Spain.
6. The resolutions of  the General Assembly from 1965 onwards have not allowed Spain 
to regain Gibraltar, although the objectives indicated have been satisfied as they did not adopt 
the British thesis which claims that where there is a non-self-governing territory, there is 
a population with the right to self-determination. The coupling of  the vindications of  the 
Republic of  Argentina on the Falkland Islands with the Spanish vindication on Gibraltar 
favoured the course of  the latter as it counted on the backing of  the Latin American countries.
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III. HISPANO-BRITISH NEGOTIATIONS IN 1966: RUPTURE AND 
CONFRONTATION
7. Negotiations were held between Spain and Great Britain from the 18th May 1966. 
To regain sovereignty over Gibraltar, Spain was willing to make extensive concessions: it 
would accept the British military base and a privileged statute for the Gibraltarians. But for 
Great Britain, any negotiation on sovereignty was completely out of  the question: it would 
only deal with matters to settle problems originating from the application of  the Treaty of  
Utrecht and to return to normality, that is to say, to the revocation of  restrictive measures on 
overland communication adopted by the Spanish Government in previous years and to the 
improvement in neighbourly relationships.
8. Unilateral measures that provoked protest and reaction in the other party caused tension 
to rise. Great Britain reinforced self-government and promoted a qualitative leap in the 
political nature of  the local authorities; in May 1969, it gave Gibraltar a Constitution whose 
preamble stated that: “Her Majesty’s Government will never enter into arrangements under 
which the people of  Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of  another State against their 
freely and democratically expressed wishes.” Spain, on the other hand, ended up blocking all 
communications including telegraphic and telephonic ones; it denied British  military aviation 
access to Spanish airspace and established a prohibited zone to foreign flights, including civil 
ones.
9. This policy was counterproductive as it nurtured in the local population a spirit of  
survival within a hostile environment, favouring the crystallisation of  a Gibraltarian identity 
and causing, by means of  adequate lobbying, a revival of  anti-Spanish stereotypes in Great 
Britain.
IV. DEMOCRATIC SPAIN: FROM THE 1980 LISBON TO THE 1984 
BRUSSELS AGREEMENT
10. The establishment of  a democratic regime in Spain on the death of  General Franco 
(1975) and its foreseeable entry into NATO and the European Community encouraged new 
initiatives to break the deadlock.
11. The Lisbon Agreement, a gentlemen’s agreement signed on 10th April 1980, was 
the starting point for the formal resuming of  negotiations. Unfortunately, discrepancies 
in its interpretation became an insuperable obstacle to its application. In the beginning of  
1982, it appeared that the stalemate would be overcome, but the Falkland Islands armed 
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conflict between Argentina and Great Britain ruined the attempt. Afterwards, Britain’s lack 
of  willingness to even listen to the sovereignty question, the insistence on obtaining prior 
assurances on the air services to the Gibraltar Airport and the repercussions of  Spain’s future 
adherence to the European Community interfered again and again with the numerous contacts 
made by both sides from September 1983 onwards.
12. It was finally possible to reach an agreement. On the 27th November 1984, the Brussels 
Agreement made way for putting the Lisbon Agreement into practice in all its aspects, opening 
a negotiating process to solve all the differences on Gibraltar, including the questions of  
sovereignty and to promote, for mutual benefit, economic, cultural, tourist, air traffic and 
environmental cooperation based on equality of  rights and reciprocity. The value of  the 
reference to sovereignty was political and psychological. For the first time, Great Britain expressly 
accepted to talk about this although the parties were still far from sharing the objective of  
the negotiations. In the same Agreement it was warned that the British Government would 
wholly maintain its commitment to respect the rights of  the Gibraltarians according to the 
preamble of  the 1969 Constitution. It was therefore necessary to prepare for a long period 
of  negotiation even though now, it seemed that there was a convergence of  interests of  both 
Spain and Britain that had not existed in the past. The fact that a few weeks after the Brussels 
Agreement Britain reached an agreement with the Republic of  China on the future statute of  
Hong Kong seemed to bode well.
13. Unfortunately, when the time came to test Great Britain’s willingness to facilitate the 
“osmosis” of  Gibraltar with the neighbouring Spanish territory, the results were disappointing. 
The touchstone was the agreement to facilitate common civil use of  the airport situated on 
the isthmus (2nd December 1987). Given the opposition of  the local Gibraltar authorities to 
the project, the British Government refused to carry out the agreement. The consequences 
on the process initiated in Brussels were devastating. The rounds of  negotiations became 
inoperative routines to keep up appearances and Spain devoted its efforts to preventing that 
the Nato and EC condition of  the Rock (under a special regime) should be taken advantage 
of  by Great Britain to favour the evolution of  a Gibraltar statute contrary to Spanish rights 
and interests.
V. FROM THE MATUTES PROPOSAL (1997) TO THE UNSUCCESSFUL 
NEGOTIATIONS OF 2001-2002
14. Ten years later, the Spanish Government tried to break the stalemate by means of  
the Matutes Proposal that included a transitional period of  joint sovereignty for fifty years, 
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the voluntary keeping of  British nationality, protection of  the population’s linguistic and 
cultural identity and a broad statute of  autonomy within the framework of  the Spanish 
Constitution with their own courts and fiscal regime. The Matutes Proposal, however, was 
not given the reception that the Spanish Minister had hoped for, mostly due to the fact that 
the Gibraltar authorities had in mind a plan to finalise their decolonisation through a process 
of  constitutional modernisation that would grant the Rock a statute similar to that of  the Isle 
of  Man or the Channel Islands. They tried to impose their presence in any eventual Hispano-
British negotiations as the third party involved (not only, as in the past, as part of  the British 
delegation).
15. In these circumstances and in the middle of  a series of  incidents, the Spanish 
Government decided to intensify in Brussels its campaign of  condemnation of  the systematic 
breaching of  the EC directives in Gibraltar and the parasite nature of  its economy that 
favoured money laundering and tax evasion through fictitious societies whose number, 
round fifty thousand at that point, was greater than the number of  inhabitants in the colony. 
Likewise, the Spanish Government persevered in its policy of  impeding the adoption of  EU 
agreements and regulatory acts which, when applied to Gibraltar, it deemed detrimental to the 
vindication of  the Rock. The situation became even more uncomfortable when the matter of  
the Tireless arose. This was a British nuclear submarine that had broken down and was moored 
in Gibraltar on the 19th May 2000 awaiting repair. 
16. At the beginning of  2001, however, an unexpected initiative by Tony Blair raised hopes 
of  reaching a general agreement by the middle of  2002. The European Council echoed this, 
demonstrating its satisfaction about the re-launching of  the “Brussels Process” and inviting 
the Commission to explore the ways in which the EU could support any agreements reached. 
There are some who consider that the British Government made a move with its commitment 
to do away with anachronisms and by a reconsideration of  British interests in the light of  
the beneficial collaboration that, within and outside the EU, had been established with Spain 
under Aznar’s Government.
 17. The Blair Government tried to make shared sovereignty with Spain in Gibraltar a 
definitive or, at least, a temporarily unlimited solution rather than just a transitory one as Spain 
had proposed in the past. Without prejudice to this, the Blair Government wished to maintain 
the military base exclusively under British control, although its use would be opened up to 
members of  NATO (therefore including Spain). Finally, the Blair Government maintained 
as a sine qua non requirement that any eventual Hispano-British agreement be accepted by the 
population of  Gibraltar. This led to an impasse.
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18. Blair’s proposals met with ferocious opposition in the British Parliament thanks to 
the efficient performance of  the Gibraltarian lobby and the very influential Armed Forces’ 
spokesmen and the conservative means of  communication that acted on public opinion 
still open to stereotypes coined in the times of  Elizabeth I. On the other hand, the Blair 
Government underestimated the capacity of  the Gibraltarian authorities to politically spoil 
any proposals that seemed to be on a collision course with their aim to progress towards self-
government. On the 4th October 2001 all the members and former members of  the Gibraltar 
Legislative Assembly signed a “declaration of  unity” in which they affirmed that the people of  
Gibraltar would never negotiate or renounce their inalienable right to self-determination, their 
decolonisation being a bilateral matter between Gibraltar and Great Britain (through a process 
of  modernisation in the constitutional relationship with Britain), since Article X of  the Treaty 
of  Utrecht should be considered terminated according to general norms of  International Law. 
In the referendum of  7th November 2002, the Gibraltarians said no (98.97% of  the voters) to 
the principle of  shared sovereignty.
VI. A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR GIBRALTAR AND A TRIPARTITE 
FORUM FOR NEGOTIATION
19. Gibraltar wished to take advantage of  the process of  modernisation and greater self-
government of  the British dependent territories proposed in the White Paper of  the British 
Government in March 1999 (Partnership for Progress and Prosperity : Britain and the Overseas Territories) 
to put an end to its condition of  non-self-governing territory by an act of  self-determination. 
However, the new Constitution – a charter  granted by the Privy Council on the 19th December 
2006, that came into effect on the 2nd January 2007 – did not alter the international statute 
of  the Rock. The joint declaration of  the British and Gibraltarian Governments of  the 27th 
March 2006 at the end of  the negotiations on the constitutional text affirms that this “provides 
for the degree of  self-government which is compatible with British sovereignty of  Gibraltar 
and with the fact the UK is responsible for Gibraltar’s external relations”. The people of  
Gibraltar, it added, “have the right to self-determination” but the UK “holds the view that it is 
constrained by the Treaty of  Utrecht, and therefore, that the independence would only be an 
option with Spain’s consent”. A day later, the Undersecretary of  the Foreign Office expressed 
this in similar terms in a letter to the Spanish Minister for Foreign Affairs.
20. Within the United Nations, the Prime Minister of  Gibraltar, Peter Caruana, 
unsuccessfully tried to convince the members of  the Decolonisation Committee (june 2006) 
and the Fourth Commission of  the General Assembly (October 2006) that the approval 
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by referendum of  the new Constitution would entail an application of  the “fourth option” 
mentioned by General Assembly’s Resolution 2625 (XXV). According to the Prime Minister 
Gibraltar should disappear from the list of  non-self-governing territories because Gibraltar 
would enjoy “a status freely determined by the people…in an act of  self-determination”. 
21. Nevertheless, once the negotiations on the co-sovereignty had failed, it was necessary to 
put the Brussels Process aside and adopt a new strategy that came into force at the end of  2004 
with the establishment of  a Tripartite Forum for Dialogue for cross-border cooperation. This 
Forum has offered Gibraltar the participation on an equal footing with Great Britain and Spain 
in matters of  interstate cooperation. Its decisions are taken unanimously, having foreseen 
that when matters of  exclusive competence of  the States are involved, the UK will not give 
its consent without the Gibraltarian Government being in agreement. The Forum has found 
a natural complement in the Joint Committee for cooperation between Gibraltar and the 
neighbouring municipalities of  the Campo de Gibraltar (the Spanish territory around the border 
with Gibraltar) that can be extended to the regional authorities of  Andalusia.
22. The Forum gave its first results in September 2006 on reaching agreements to facilitate 
overland traffic, telecommunications, payment of  pensions to former Spanish workers on 
the Rock and the opening in Gibraltar of  a Cervantes Institute for teaching Spanish. The 
most striking of  the agreements –whose legal nature is disputed- was the elimination of  civil 
air traffic restrictions by Spain, the inauguration of  a direct flight Madrid-Gibraltar and the 
planned construction of  a single passenger terminal in the airport, situated on the isthmus. 
The prospect that Spanish customs agents and police will carry out their duties on an aerial 
corbel over Spanish territory highlights the Gibraltarian sensitivity to any step, short though 
it may be, that could imply the carrying out of  Spanish sovereign competence on the other 
side of  the Fence.
VII. LEGAL CONCLUSIONS
23. From a legal point of  view, the historical process reveals that Article X of  the Treaty of  
Utrecht is still the valid title of  British sovereignty over Gibraltar although the interpretation 
of  the limits of  the ceded territory has been divergent.
24. Even having discarded the extreme opinion that Spain ceded the property but not the 
sovereignty of  Gibraltar to Great Britain, it has been upheld that the cession “with no territorial 
jurisdiction” presupposed the transfer of  only the places enumerated in Article X, to wit, the 
city, castle, port, fortifications and fort, with no projection over land space (the isthmus) and 
adjacent waters. Great Britain replied with the rule of  the effective range of  a cannon  that was 
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highly popular in the XVIII Century, to maintain that the land and sea territory covered by 
Gibraltar’s cannons was under British sovereignty.
 25. This argument was very weak when applied to the isthmus, as the Spanish cannons 
from La Línea had Gibraltar also under their reach until Great Britain, taking advantage of  
the alliance against the Napoleonic armies on the peninsula, demolished the forts of  San Felipe 
and Santa Barbara. The isthmus was considered neutral ground, no a no man’s land. If  the 
sovereignty cessions were to be interpreted in a restrictive sense, the necessary conclusion 
was that the isthmus was Spanish. Something else is what could be deduced from the acts 
and omissions of  the parties involved throughout these three hundred years that classified as 
promise, renunciation, recognition or acquiescence, could originate obligations modifying the Treaty or 
stopping its application.  It was thus, in the 1966 negotiations, that the British Government 
invoked the usucapion on which to base its sovereignty over part of  the occupied isthmus.
26. As to the waters, the general norm by which sovereignty over the coast is projected onto 
adjacent sea plays in Britain’s favour. It certainly is not an imperative principle and therefore, 
it is possible to limit a territorial cession merely to land, conceived as a dry coast, but this is an 
exception that requires proof  that this has been the will of  the parties involved. In fact, Spain 
did not dare convert the waters of  the Bay into internal waters by closing the entrance with a 
straight line between Algeciras and Europa Point.
27. The present force of  Spain’s right of  preference of  having the Rock in case Great 
Britain decided to grant, sell or by any means to alienate it,  is, on the other hand, recognised 
by the British Government: “Article X of  the Treaty (of  Utrecht) gave Spain the right to be 
the first to claim its sovereignty if  Gibraltar were to cease being British. All constitutional 
change must be compatible with the Treaty of  Utrecht, and moreover, applicable in practice. 
Independence would be an option for Gibraltar if  Spain were in agreement.” (Declaration by 
the British Government before the Houses of  Parliament on the 14th December 1995: White Paper on 
Overseas Territories, March 1999). The non-recognition by the United Nations of  the population 
of  Gibraltar as the holder of  the right to self-determination avoids the incompatibility of  
Spain’s right of  first refusal with a posterior imperative norm. Spain is not only Gibraltar’s 
neighbour but also the holder of  rights and legitimate expectations according to the same 
valid treaty from which the origin of  British sovereignty over the Rock comes, as well as others 
deduced from the decolonisation principles.
28. At no other time in history has Spain counted on a better-prepared constitutional order 
for the territorial reintegration of  Gibraltar. On the one hand, the autonomous organisation 
of  the State facilitates differentiated regimes that take into consideration the peculiarities 
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of  autonomous communities, both regional and national. On the other hand, even without 
making express mention, Gibraltar is one of  the assumptions behind Article 144 b) of  
the Constitution when it makes provision for the Parliament (Cortes Generales) to be able to 
authorise or agree to a Statute of  Self-Government for motives of general interest for territories that 
are not integrated into provincial organisation. And yet again, nothing impedes, the Gibraltar 
Statute in the Spanish constitutional order counting on the international guarantee granted by 
a treaty concluded between Spain and Great Britain
29. Having said this, it is obliged to pay attention to the possible unleashing of  imitative 
claims in other Spanish regions that could raise the costs of  the recovery of  Gibraltar to 
totally unacceptable levels for Spain. Gibraltar would fit into an autonomous Spain but not 
everything fits into an autonomous regime, at the risk of  making the State an empty shell. On 
the other hand, Morocco has to find additional motives to put its aspirations on Ceuta and 
Melilla in the same mould as the Spanish on Gibraltar. Although legally speaking they are not 
the same, the parallel between both situations has been repeated actively and passively so often 
as to become commonplace. Gibraltar could come back to Spain like a boomerang from the 
other side of  the Straits.
VIII. LOOKING TOWARD THE FUTURE
30. Assuming that the political will to recover Gibraltar exists, the Spanish proposals have 
responded, in the past, to a sequence that is coherent with limits that can barely be altered. In 
this sense:
First, Spain may consent to a formula to share the sovereignty with Great Britain for a 
limited period of  time (up to fifty years), if  and when the aforementioned sovereignty 
automatically reverts to Spain at the end of  that period or, at least, a clause for revision is 
established; in the case of  its accepting shared sovereignty permanently, it would be essential to 
accompany this with a clause similar to Article X of  the Treaty of  Utrecht.
Second, Spain could share the military base with Great Britain in the same terms, even 
accepting for a time an operative control that is exclusively British  and afterwards negotiating 
agreements similar to those made with NATO allies or within the framework of  European 
policy of  defence and security.
Third, Spain promotes a regime that respects the identity and legitimate interests of  the 
population of  Gibraltar, improves its self-government and may accept the guarantee, besides 
the one granted by the Spanish Constitution, of  a treaty with Great Britain whose duration 
may be extended once the period of  shared sovereignty has concluded.
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31. In these terms, Spain could agree to the exclusion of  Gibraltar from the list of  non-self-
governing territories and consider abrogated the rights of  Article X of  the Treaty of  Utrecht. 
In the EU environment, the normative basis of  the incorporation of  Gibraltar would pass 
from the – present – Article 299.4 of  the ECT (European territory whose relationships are 
assumed as a member State) to the Article 299.1 (sovereign territory of  member States). Spain 
would cooperate with Great Britain in the improvement of  the EU Statute on the Rock that 
raises varied and complex problems in a co-sovereignty regime.
32. Spain cannot, instead:
First, Accept shared sovereignty over Gibraltar in perpetuity or for an indefinite period, 
incompatible with the reestablishment of  territorial integrity that has been the lever of  its 
reclamation. Moreover, to share the sovereignty in areas that were not ceded in Utrecht is a 
form of  ceding, not recovering, what had not been ceded.
Second, Accept a military base that is exclusively British and that occupies almost half  the 
surface territory of  the Rock, in the same terms.
Third, Agree on a regime that makes Spanish territorial sovereignty an empty shell, 
destabilises the autonomous territorial architecture of  the State and consolidates Gibraltar’s 
parasitism on its surroundings.
33. In any case, the role of  the population of  Gibraltar must be reconsidered. Spain is not 
going to renounce its rights – the old ones in the Treaty of  Utrecht and the new ones in the 
decolonisation – yet it must be sensitive to the evolution of  the right to self-determination 
that in these last years has come to reinforce the aspirations of  a population whose identity 
has been growing while recognising a prominence that makes it responsible for its own 
acts. Instead of  denying this right, it would be a better choice to insist that this right is not 
exclusive. Of  course, it is not just a question of  recognising Spain as a conspicuous neighbour 
whose security must not be threatened or who should not be annoyed too much so as not to 
complicate a pleasant life. It is a question of  recognising that Spain also has rights, within and 
outside the normative framework of  decolonisation and that, therefore, self-determination 
of  the territory requires a freely agreed arrangement of  the legitimate interests of  all parties 
involved.
34. Really it is not the Treaty of  Utrecht that limits the right to the  self-determination of  
Gibraltar, but the right to self-determination itself  according to the interpretation that the 
General Assembly’s resolutions have given to it and that the Gibraltarians and those who 
support their aspirations tend to ignore or hope to rewrite unilaterally from metajuridical 
positions. The need to reach an understanding must be insisted upon and, as a means to 
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this end, a long process will be necessary to persuade the population that Gibraltar is not in 
the English Channel like the Isle of  Man, nor, even less so, is it a rock in the middle of  the 
ocean; it is an extraordinarily beautiful Rock that rises at the end of  a peninsula one hundred 
thousand times larger than itself  and of  which it forms part. One cannot leave a colonial 
anachronism to enter an anomaly that has been fattened by the exploitation of  sovereign 
prerogative and EU advantages to the detriment of  the rights of  Spain.
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